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Anglo-German Naval Rivalry
as a Factor in the Deterioration
of their Relations before 1914:
A Study of their Negotiations, 1909-1911
T ong~Chin Rhee
Although not the most important factor, the rapidly intensifying naval rivalry and the
resultant tension between Britain and Germany significantly contributed to the outbreak
of the World War in 1914. The rather radical change of German foreign policy. after 1870,
and especially after Otto von Bismarck's departure from public office in 1890 had created
diplomatic crises which Bismarck's successors were ill equipped to handle. Furthermore,
Kaiser wilhelm II's obsession with global foreign and military policy had created an
atmosphere of suspicion and alarm among the major powers. The fear was that the
German military power became more and more double-edged - both military and naval.
It was in this context that Germany's extensive naval program eventually antagonized
Britain and drove her into the arms of Quai d'Orsay - leading to the Entente Cordiale
(which could have been avoided) and the disastrous Agadir Crisis.

German Navy in Perspective: the Naval Competition and the Background of Negotiations
Behind the efforts to build a modern navy during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, there
was a rather substantial tradition of maritime and trade supremacy in the form of the
Hanseatic League. During the early days of Brandenburg-Prussia, the Great Elector
Frederick Wilhelm had learned a great deal about the importance of sea-power, colonies
and maritime trade from Frederick Henry of Holland. However, from 1660 to 1675 the
Brandenburg navy remained only a dream. Then in 1667 Johann Becher, a chemist,
expounded his views on maritime power through his book - Political Discourse on the
Causes of the Rise and Decline of Towns and Countries - in which he deplored the
decline of German trade and placed the blame on the lack of resolute maritime activities.
This book, however, had no immediate impact on the German mind, although much later
a more ardent reader much impressed by the message achieved considerable success in
building a navy. The reader was Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was indeed strongly influenced by
Becher's argument. 1
In 1684, the origin of the Brandenburg navy was laid by the es tablishment of an
"admiralty" in Berlin. But this navy was simply a motley collection of a few vessels and
guns. This pitiful state lasted until the mid-nineteenth century. Interestingly, the first
modern German fleet was planned by the Frankfurt Assembly (1848) which saw in it the
necessary symbol of German national unity. However, no systematic efforts were made to
build a powerful navy. The sense of urgency was totally lacking until the coming of
diplomatic complications with Denmark over the Schleswig question. The naval blockade
of the Prussian coast by the Danish navy provided the necessary stimulus for a navy.
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To be sure, other difficulties hindered the project. Financial problems led to a virtual
dissolution of the newly founded navy. But a modest naval policy was drawn up in 1848,
providing a precious guideline for future efforts: "Germany should, for the present, make
no attempt to gain a place in the ranks of the first-class naval powers, but content herself
with the protection of her Baltic and North Sea coasts, and her sea-borne trade. " [italics
mine 12 In fact, this policy lasted up to the time of Wilhelm II and the Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz - although by that time it was intentionally deceptive.
A new argument was started in the 1850's and 1860's amidst a new scientific
development. Prince Adalbert - the founder of the modern German navy - proposed a
vigorous naval building to his colleagues citing the argument of Captain Mingayes, R.N.:
"The triumph of steam over sails and oars presented Prussia with a splendid opportunity
to create sea-power which should be 'mighty' from the outset. "3 Prince Adalbert had
three basic alternatives: 1) a defensive coast protection (old policy); 2) an offensive coast
protection; and 3) an independent sea-power. A conclusion - which proved significant in
the light of later expansion - was drawn based on these:
Germany must either build no battleships or at once build so many that she can
act towards her neighbors as an independent Sea-Power. Anything intermediate
would be a useless expense ... and would arouse in the nation expectations which,
in the moment of danger, our sea-power would not be able to fulfill.4
The rise of the naval problem was instrumental in arousing popular support for a
Prussian navy. Naval impotence had proven to be embarrassingly detrimental to Prussia's
standing as a Power. Already a public enthusiasm of a sort was generated for a navy
during the 1864 Danish-Prussian War. Nonetheless, this popular support proved to be
ephemeral. The navy bill of 1868 had produced very little change , and the naval inaction
during the Franco-Prussian War definitely cooled the public ardor for a strengthened
navy.
With the accession of Wilhelm II, the German navy finally came out of oblivion . The
rise of imperialistic colonialism and overseas territorial expansion of the major European
powers significantly influenced German policy. Kaiser's ambition and vigor soon found a
companion in the person of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who was appointed the Minister
of State for the Navy in 1897. Soon steps were taken to build a large navy. Formerly, the
fate of the naval appropriation depended completely on the relationship between the
Reichstag and the government, on an uncertain annual basis. This insecurity in the naval
program was soon corrected by Tirpitz's admirable efforts.
Tirpitz argued for a considerable increase in naval power. He explained: 1) Germany 's
naval strength actually declined in recent years; 2) new German colonies necessitated a
stronger fleet; 3) the economic growth and population increase had expanded German
investment overseas and increased thereby the possibilities of clashes with other powers.
For this, the German navy was still too weak to playa role. In fact, the radius of action
of German battleships was so limited at the end of the century that they were suited only
for coastal defense operations. The German emphasis on armament and armor at the
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expense of speed and coal capacity had reduced the mobility and action radius of all the
available ships.
However, the combination of domestic and international events was creating a
favorable atmosphere for the expansion of the German Navy. On the domestic front,
strong propaganda and patriotic agitation by the Navy League (and the Pan-Germans) and
the skillful maneuvers of the Press Bureau under von Tirpitz helped create a big change.
Internationally, the British involvement with the Boers in South Africa had clearly
demonstrated the clearcut value of a powerful fleet, and intensified German frustration.
In addition, the British naval molestation of neutral shipping around the South African
coast enraged German public opinion - all this in turn was skillfully exploited by the
naval-minded elite to advance the cause of naval expansion. S The result was the substanial
Navy Act of 1898 and the gigantic Navy Bill of 1900, the latter being passed amidst a
frenzied atmosphere.
Von Tirpitz's memorandum accompanying the 1900 Navy Act vividly illustrated the
serious German intent that underlay the expansion program:
To protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances, there
is only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that, even for the
adversary with the greatest sea-power, a war against it would involve such dangers as
to imperil his position in the world. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary
that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power,
because a great naval power will not as a rule be in a position to concentrate all its
striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us ... with
superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially

weaken the enemy that in spite of a victory . . . his own position in the world
would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet [my own italics} . 6
The wording of the memorandum (the "risk theory" of the German Navy) was clearly
arranged to show that Germany intended to use her fleet as an instrument for diplomatic
bargaining, particularly with Britain. To the British, this alarming development together
with the Kaiser's indiscreet and pompous speeches (including the Kruger Telegram affair)
indicated difficult future relations with the German Empire. Indeed, the tension which
was to inflame the relations between London and Berlin was gradually but unmistakably
growing.
Acting on the Act of 1900, Germany soon proceeded to produce a "high-sea-fleet"
capable of "going anywhere and doing anything." Just one year after, there were already
five first-class battleships, which was an impressive achievement in contrast to 1886-1890
period. By 1906, a revised program was added in which all the ships which the Reichstag
opposed in 1900 were restored to the navy.
Germany also added to her battleship program an extensive cruiser building program.
In fact, by 1911, Germany's cruiser program looked so successful that the British and
German cruiser contingents were regarded equal in strength. Faced with this situation, the
British authorities decided to embark on the building of new squadrons of small-size
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cruisers with high speed.
While the tension became more intense between London and Berlin, a new factor in
ship-building techniques brought forth a completely different outlook on Anglo-German
naval relationships. It was the advent of the revolutionary battleship Dreadnought. It was
the result of the research done by the British naval experts - while Admiral Sir John
Fisher was First Sea Lord - on the basis of information concerning gunnery practices and
the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War. The Naval Annual of 1906 had maintained that
based on the long distance engagements during the Battle of Tsushima Strait, medium
armament was of no value in the future naval warfare. 7 Hence, Dreadnought (launched in
1906) was equipped only with heavy armament (ten 12-inch guns) for superior fire power
and, even so, possessed a speed of 21 knots. The result was the total obsolescence of
practically all the existing battleships of the world with mixed armament.
When Dreadnought appeared, Germany was still emphasizing battleships of mixed
armament. In fact, Germany was so completely unprepared for this naval revolution that
from 1905 to 1907 not a single keel of a battleship was laid for new construction. But
Germany adopted a "Dreadnought policy" in 1907, and four "all-big-gun" ships were
completed by 1910. And as soon as the true nature of Dreadnoughts was known, German
naval authorities prepared a new Navy Act. Under these circumstances - the complete
obsolescence of virtually all previous types of ships - Britain was forced to start a
competition practically from an equal level.
With the new Navy Act of 1908, Germany made an impressive stride in organizing a
new fleet. The extensive construction program dramatically altered the naval balance of
power around 1910. 8 German naval com bat strength furthermore was organized by
compulsory conscription. Officially reported, four fifths of the German naval strength
was in constant combat preparedness, while only half of the British Navy was so
prepared. The fact that fleets are more maneuverable and easily mobilizable constituted a
greater threat to British security. The German Navy - mostly in home waters, while that
of Britain was not - could be alerted and brought to action almost immediately. This was
certainly a warning of potential danger to Great Britain.
The possibility of further expansion was implicit in the nature of naval programs
adopted in Germany and the political atmosphere in which they were implemented. The
fact was that Berlin regarded its naval laws as immutable when confronted with
discussions for disarmament or limitation, but regarded as flexible when favorable
political circumstances presented themselves in advancing toward a higher standard of
naval strength. Admiral von Tirpitz managed the naval laws in such a way that he
succeeded in warding off unwelcome interferences from the Reichstag and in leaving the
Marine Office totally free in shaping the naval program for the sake of continued
expansion. 9 Particularly, the loose use of naval terms in the laws gave him the necessary
flexibility to manipulate them as he saw fit. 1 0
The German Navy and its spectacular expansion aroused great alarm in Great Britain,
whose life depended on the supremacy of her fleet and who was just across the North Sea
from Germany. The impending threat was clear in many of the Kaiser's statements. For

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol6/iss2/6
66

4

Rhee: Anglo-German Naval Rivalry as a Factor in the Deterioration of Th
instance, on July 3, 1900, the Kaiser declared at Kiel that "Germany's greatness makes it
impossible for her to do without the ocean - but the ocean also proves that even in the
distance ... without Germany and the German Emperor no great decision dare
henceforth be taken." 11
The excessive hurry and noise with which the German naval expansion was achieved
had deeply disturbed the sensitivities of other great powers, and in the end proved to be
counterproductive for German security. The alarming rise of Germany's Anglophobia and
its clumsy exploitation by her authorities produced effective countermeasures from other
powers, particularly from Britain herself. The most typical example of these
heavy-handed German methods was the ill-advised proposal that Britain should abandon
her Two-Power Standard and accept the 3 to 2 ratio (during the final negotiation of
1908-1911). Germany made this serious mistake in spite of her knowledge that to Britain
the navy was a life and death issue and not primarily a matter of prestige as in her case.
Since 1904, British foreign policy had the theme of "German peril" as its basic
foundation. The Entente Cordiale, the Triple En tente of 1907, and the episode of
Algeciras were a series of events in which the conflict between London and Berlin was
explicit. They were the products as well as the origins of conflicts. British Foreign
Secretary Sir Edward Gray stated:
Germany started a naval programme, which everybody considered a challenge to
the British fleet ... Germany increased this naval competition and rejected,
sometimes even resented, English overtures for a naval agreement . . . . She
compelled us to find safety both in increasing our naval construction and by
adopting a policy which would not leave us exposed to [others 1 hostility .... 12
The tension thus created between Britain and Germany increased by the discussion of
the invasion of Britain within the German General Staff. Through inflammatory
pamphlets and through potentially unfriendly activities of many German officers coming
to Britain on furloughs, the tensions and mutual suspicion were intensified.1 3 Under such
circumstances, the possibility of negotiated settlement was gradually receding, especially
as the German fleet strength presented a greater and greater threat to Britain. 14

Negotiations, 1909-1911: Immediate Past to 1909
As the German Navy grew more powerful each year, the British Admiralty was forced
to adopt the Dreadnought policy. However, this was in essence a policy of "failure" in
the sense that it virtually wiped out their naval surpemacy and involved a huge sum of
fresh funds. Politically, this also posed an embarrassing problem for the Liberal
Government, which desired a reduction of armaments among the powers and an
expensive program of social reforms at home.
Acting under such a bind, the British cabinet raised the question of general limitation
of armies and navies at the second Hague Conference in 1907. The response was poor.
Germany was determined to oppose such a plan. Von Tirpitz explained Germany's
opposition: "Here is England, already more than four times as strong as Germany, in
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alliance with Japan, and probably so with France, and you, the colossus, come and ask
Germany, the pigmy, to disarm. From the point of view of the public it is laughable and
Machiavellian, and we shall never agree to anything of the sort. ,,15 Britain explained that
for her the navy was the first and the only line of defense, while German security was
sufficiently guaranteed by her army - the strongest in Europe. Should Germany add a
powerful navy, and pursue a policy based on the fundamental distrust of London's
policy, this was to seriously compromise British position. However, Germany was
adamant, and the Hague Conference on naval limitations was miscarried. This naturally
aggravated the entire situation between the two countries.
After the failure, all the hopes of multilateral reduction faded. There now remained
only the possibility of direct negotiations between the two. The British Liberal Cabinet
was well disposed to such a step, but the German Kaiser refused to negotiate interpreting it as a sign of weakness on the part of Britain. Germany misjudged that
Britain would be unable to withstand the financial strain from the increased naval
expenditure. German Chancellor von Bulow even tended to approve ideas of his advisors
that Germany might try to exploit the British financial weakness and strike an important
quid pro quo: German recognition of the British naval supremacy in return for British
neutrality in case of a continental war. However, Bulow did not remain in office long
enough to try out the bargain. In the meantime, British opinion aggravated virtually to
the point of panic as the German naval construction accelerated and seemed capable of
overtaking the British strength by the spring of 1912. Under such circumstances, London
had no option but to push her own program and maintain her supremacy at all cost and
nip the German attempt to overturn the precarious balance of power in Europe.

First Stage of Negotiations, April-June, 1909
It was not surprising, then, that Sir Edward Grey and the British Cabinet would never
allow the naval question to recede into the background. Sir Edward suggested in the
Parliament that a healthy general discussion between the two could be had on the naval
question - provided there was a prior exchange of information on the respective naval
estimates, which would dispell further mutual misunderstandings. The foreign secretary
proposed to German Ambassador Count Metternich that naval attaches of both
countries be allowed to observe the naval ship-building as a basis for future negotiations.
Count Metternich, sensing the seriousness and resolution of the British Government,
urged Berlin to consider the proposal in a favorable light. But Berlin reacted in the wrong
direction.
Germany had been trying for some time to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale
and the Triple Entente and to break them if possible through the Moroccan Crisis and
later the Bosnian Crisis. This so-called "shock diplomacy" did not achieve the German
objective. On the contrary, this policy - basically that of enigmatic Baron Holstein backfired and hardened the British position vis-a-vis Germany. As Berlin realized that
Britain could not be detached from the Entente, some influential quarters in Germany
wanted to pursue a more positive policy. For instance, Professor Schiemann suggested in
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Kreuz-Zeitung that Britain should be induced to conclude an alliance with both Berlin
and Vienna so as to neutralize the entente. But Sir Charles Hardinge, Permanent
Under-Secretary, flatly brushed aside the suggestion as a German ruse to dominate all of
Europe, and recommended that no alliance with Germany should ever be
contemplated.1 6
If Britain was unyielding, Germany had no intention of reducing her naval expansion.
Germany was fmnly convinced that "force" was the only deciding factor in the relations
amongst nations and that "strength in combat" (Streitbarkeit) and the "unity of
purpose" (Sinneseinheit) and not the "superiority of civilization" (Uberlegenheit der
Kultur) counted in the maintenance of nations. 1 7 Therefore, discussions with London on
naval issues were little more than talks at cross purposes. Sir John Fisher concluded that
the prime purpose of the German Government was "to gain time and avoid a preventive
war until the danger-zone had been passed" in terms of naval comparison with Britain. 18
However, the British Government still felt that a lessening of the financial burdens of
armament was possible under some modus vivendi. Grey and his advisers in the Foreign
Office regarded the ententes with France and Russia purely as defensive measures and not
specifically directed against Germany. Hence, this diplomatic alignment should not be
considered a hindrance by Berlin to conclude an accord on naval problems with London.
However, Berlin still assumed the hostile nature of the entente, and insisted that a naval
arrangement was possible only after broad political agreement. This German mood was
clearly shown through the Kaiser himself who wrote:
Count Metternich must be informed that good relations with England at the
price of the building of the German navy are not desired by me. If England intends
graciously to extend us her hand only with the intimation that we must limit our
fleet, this is a groundless impertience, which involves a heavy insult to the German
people and their Kaiser which must be rejected .... France and Russia might with
equal reason then demand a limitation of our land armaments. The German fleet is
not built against anyone ... but according to our needs! . .. This ... will be carried
out to the last iota; whether it suits the British or not .... If they want war, they

can begin it; we do not fear it! 19
Chancellor Bulow took up the idea of negotiation in March, 1909. However, the Kaiser
was indignant over the concessions suggested by Count Metternich without anything in
return. 20 The concessions which the Kaiser referred to were a statement that no German
supplementary law would be introduced in 1912 regarding the naval program. Under such
situation, it was indeed a difficult task for Bulow to persuade the Kaiser to negotiate.
The German conditions for negotiations, however, were not based on a viable formula
of mutual compromise - acceptable to both sides. Admiral von Tirpitz told Bulow that
the German Navy was willing to accept a 3 to 4 naval ratio with Britain. 21 Billow,
however, knew that Tirpitz's proposal would never be accepted by London, but would in
fact increase the British enmity and suspicion. 22 For this reason, Tirpitz was persuaded
to drop the proposal at least for awhile.
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Despite these differences, somehow between the Kaiser, Bulow and Tirpitz, a broad
guideline of approach was worked out. They decided that a naval agreement would be
acceptable to them if it were accompanied by some general detente such as the British
declaration of neutrality in case of a war involving Germany, or by some colonial
concessions, or by some mutual guarantee of friendship. All these demarches should be
made solely on the basis of the existing German program without a change.
The German Foreign Office took the "colonial formula" as its policy, and sent Baron
W. A. von Stumm to London for pourparlers. The Stumm draft proposal contained the
three alternatives: 1) a military alliance providing for mutual assistance if either party
were attacked by one or more powers; 2) a neutrality agreement in which both powers
would promise not to commit themselves to any mutually hostile alignments and remain
neutral in any war in which the other power was engaged; and 3) an entente respecting
each other's territorial integrity. 2 3 The draft proposal was designed to include the
commercial as well as naval agreements with a sweeping understanding on such problems
as the Bagdad railway scheme (of Germany), a compromise on the Egyptian question, and
the problem of shipping on the high seas. 2 4 However, Stumm failed to present the draft
to Grey as the latter emphasized only the naval agreement without strings attached.
Stumm also knew perfectly well that London would not back down on its special
relations with France and Russia.
While the preliminary talks were being held in London, the acting German foreign
secretary, Kiderlen-Wachter, was approaching the new British Ambassador, Sir Edward
Goschen, with a political formula somewhat different in basic attitude. Kiderlen was of
the opinion that while "the [German 1army preserves peace, the fleet endangers it. ,,25 He
was proposing a political understanding (plus a naval agreement) along the general lines
of: 1) a mutual renunciation of war against each other; 2) an absence of any mutually
hostile coalition; and 3) benevolent neutrality to each other.
Notwithstanding Kiderlen's misgivings on the naval issue, the formula proved to be
identical to the existing German ideas being thrashed out in London, and was quite
unacceptable to Britain. Sir Eyre Crowe, Grey's Foreign Office adviser, branded it as
"patently absurd," and commented:
Germany would be able to (a) to increase her fleet to any size desired; (b) to fall
upon France or Russia without fear of English interference; (c) to impose her
hegemony on any of the less powerful states, and in case this provokes resistance,
actually count upon British "benevolent neutrality" ... ; (d) to interfere in any
part of the world whilst England would be precluded from offering any serious
resistance. 26
Grey agreed with Crowe's OplnlOn and defmtely felt that such a plan would guarantee
German hegemony on the European continent. With German hegemony on the continent,
Britain would be the next target. His Foreign Office advisers supported this view, and
concluded that the proposal was a German "trap."
At this point, the negotiations had reached an impasse. In June, Bulow convened a
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general meeting to decide on the future course of action. The conclusion was that
Germany would try to keep the negotiation going as an expedient device to pass the
"danger-zone" (i.e., until Germany attained enough naval strength) without provoking
the British "preventive war." Except for this purpose, Germany was not seriously
considering a sincere understanding with London. Naturally, under such circumstances,
no further progress could be made, and Bulow resigned in July, 1909.

Second Stage of Negotiations, August-November, 1909
Bulow gone, Theodore von Bethmann-Hollweg became the new chancellor. Basically a
civil servant, who was unfamilar with foreign affairs, he was not in a good position to
improve the strained relations with London. However, he was a good listener and was
accustomed to giving due weight to others' opinions and recommendations. Furthermore,
with his rise a somewhat refreshing atmosphere was created throughout the European
chancelleries. Within the German Foreign Office moderate Kiderlen-Wachter gained new
Chancellor's confidence as the strongest adviser. The new Chancellor himself felt that
the increasing irritation, tension and enmity with Britain were causes of possible collision
and somehow be removed.
The German Foreign Office suggested that the immediate course was to strive to better
the relations with London in view of the complications deriving from the recent Bosnian
crisis. The fear was that Britain might encourage France and Russia to take active
measures which might end in a war. Especially, the Reval meeting of Tsar Nicholas II and
Edward VII - accompanied by their political and military staff - seemed to indicate the
dangerous collaboration of Britain and Russia, whose foreign minister Izvolsky was
itching for a revenge on the Bosnian humiliation.
Count Metternich urgued the new Chancellor for an agreement with Britain. Albert
Ballin, the influential head of the Hamburg-American Line, was of the firm belief that the
building of the German fleet was "the main cause of Anglo-German antagonism," which
might lead to war. He believed that naval rivalry was a much more dangerous threat to
Germany than the feared Franco-Russian alliance, and insisted on naval discussions without political complications. 27
However, Bethmann-Hollweg was not entirely convinced of this argument. Being timid
in his mode of thinking, he went back to his predecessor's policy of insisting on political
agreements as an indispensable prerequisite to a naval accord. He argued that "England
must promise at the very outset of the negotiations for a naval agreement that her policy
will become peaceful and friendly towards us."28 Britain was willing to assure this, but
the German Chancellor was not satisfied. What he wanted was a treaty of neutrality,
which for him was absolutely vital.
On a naval agreement, Germany let it be known that she was prepared to offer a
reduction of three ships in her naval program before 1914, and to offer a new
construction ratio of 3 to 4 with Britain. However, under this new proposal, no
significant cut would be made on German strength but only on the British. It was not a
serious proposal to be favorably received by the British.
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On August 21, 1909, Bethmann-Hollweg notified Ambassador Goschen that Germany
was prepared to propose officially a naval arrangement - to be accompanied by
assurances of mutual friendship in matters of general policy . Goschen informed Grey that
Germany's condition for her naval "moderation" was that it should not be used against
her. This basic condition was agreed to by the London Government. 29
However, the British reaction to the requested political arrangement was still negative.
The London Foreign Office in contrast to Berlin's argument believed that there was no
point of conflict between the two countries other than the naval rivalry, and, hence, there
was no reason why Germany should try to restrict Britain's political freedom of action.
To still further complicate the issue , Grey now insisted (should Berlin persist on political
accord) that the arrangement had to be multilateral including France and Russia, which in
a sense would be a detente between the two contending power groups (the Triple
Alliance and the Triple Entente).30
Sir Charles Hardinge agreed with this position, and argued that a good "technical"
naval arrangement should be enough to restore peaceful relations with Germany. As to
Bethmann-Hollweg's desire for a political understanding, Britain, he proposed, could
make a declaration of general policy "without irrevocably binding the hands of England."
This could be stated in two guiding principles: 1) the preservation of peace, and 2) the
maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. As to the first principle, Britain would
declare her firm intention of not making any unprovoked attacks on any European power
and would use her influence on other powers to do the same. On the second, the British
Government would try to prevent the domination of Europe by any single power. If
London and Berlin adhered to this policy and declared their support of it, all the other
powers would concur. Other than this, Hardinge's recommendation did rule out the
political line, and emphasized only the naval approach. 3 1
Von Tirpitz made some revisions of the German naval request, but it still stuck to a 3
to 4 ratio. Kiderlen's views were similar to those of the Chancellor, although he trusted
that Britain would not make an unprovoked attack or an offensive alliance against
Germany. However, he was afraid that by rushing into an agreement with London
Germany might suffer a diplomatic humiliation like "Fashoda". This could be politically
unpopular in Germany. On the other hand, he also felt that any political formula
unaccompanied by a definite naval reduction would be unacceptable to London for
similar domestic political reasons.
On the British side, there were other fears concerning the reactions of France and
Russia towards any accord with Germany. Mr. L. Mallet, Assistant Under-Secretary of
State, told Grey that if Britain fell into the German "trap," the entente with Russia might
crumble - nullifying the painful diplomatic efforts of the preceding years. He asked Grey
to notify Russia of the German proposals, "otherwise, the Kaiser will tell the Czar that
Britain started the business first."32
However, to Goschen, the German Chancellor seemed to be very sincere, and so he
reported favorably on the prospects for an agreemen t. 3 3 Grey instructed Goschen on
September 1 that Britain was always prepared to welcome proposals for a naval program,
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but would not make political arrangements with Germany that would be "inconsistent
with British friendship with other Powers."34 Russia would be suspicious and France
would never swallow an agreement which would look like a de facto confirmation of her
loss of Alsace-Lorraine. 3 5 Sensing the British fears and reluctance, the German Foreign
Office decided to raise its political demands in a deceptive manner ; " in such small and
easy stages" that London might not be too scared to accept them. 36
Under these conditions, the negotiations continued through October without result. In
Goschen's meeting with Bethmann-Hollweg on October 14, the latter explained his ideas
on the political and naval accord. Politically, he stated, the arrangement should not be
unfriendly to France and Russia (from the British standpoint) and to Austria-Hungary
(from Berlin's standpoint). On the naval issue, he proposed a retardation of the German
program for two to three years but did not elaborate sufficiently what it really entailed.
Furthermore , the retraction would involve only the future construction plans and not the
past ones. To be more specific on the political formula, Germany wanted somethin g
similar to the Baltic Agreement (in 1908 with Sweden ), namely the status quo on the
Continent, tantamount to a formal recognition of the German control of Alsace-Lorraine.
For Britain, this would surely mean the end of the Entente Cordia Ie with France. 3 7
The British reaction was understandably negative. Crowe and Hardinge - the two most
important advisers - bitterly opposed the German proposal as a shallow trick against
British interest. The latter attacked the naval proposal, maintaining that, if Britain agreed,
it would mean that Germany would rely on the naval expansion of her allies who were
excluded in the accord. Hence, only Britain would suffer. 38 Hardinge thereon suggested
the discontinuation of the negotiations with the excuse of the impending British
elections. Grey took the excuse and cancelled the conversation. 39
Under these circumstances, the only tangible result was the mutual bitterness and the
escalating difficulties in coming to terms on the issues pending between the two
countries. German bitterness was expressed by Baron W. von Schoen, Secretary of State
on foreign affairs:
If the English ... want a naval agreement, they must pay a price for it in the
political sphere. We have no wish for a naval agreement. For this reason we cannot
accept (the British) arguments that England cannot give us more than she has given
France and Russia. England wants something from us, and must pay for it. 40

Third Stage of Negotiations, 1910: After the British Election
The British elections gave a small working majority to the Liberal Cabinet, but, on the
other hand, the naval problem became a bipartisan concern. This naturally meant a
stronger diplomatic position of the British Government vis-i-vis Germany, and certainly
a hardening of London's demand for a purely technical naval accord. Indeed, the
preliminary sounding out of Berlin revealed in the early part of 1910 that von Tirpitz was
adamantly opposed to any exchange of naval estimates - proposed earlier by Britain and
being regarded as an important element for breaking the deadlock. In February, Prince
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Henry of Prussia VIsItmg London clearly showed that Germany was now even less
disposed to a genuine naval agreement than in 1909. Britain also was convinced through the Bosnian crisis - that Germany would never be sincere toward her. Under
these conditions, Grey retaliated by including the Bagdad railway question into the
balance.
Count Metternich asked for a resumption of naval talk in March. But Britain was
averse to going through the futile conversations all over again, if Germany was not
prepared for "a modification of naval program.,,41 Hence, no progress was made between
March and July. On July 26, London presented a memorandum to Germany, proposing
"an understanding that the German naval programme should not be increased," and an
exchange of ship-building information to clear the mutual suspicion. 42 But Goschen
reported the dead-set opposition of Tirpitz to any such proposal. 43 However, after some
efforts Germany was brought around to accepting an exchange of information based on
concomitantly concluding a political understanding. 44
On August 19, Bethmann-Hollweg asked Goschen what the British response would be
should Germany promise not to increase her naval program. Goschen's answer was that
London would be willing to accept the Two-Power Standard. He further pointed out that
since Germany was mainly dependent on her army, she could easily fix the size of her
navy - required, as Berlin insisted, only for coastal defense. 45 But even after this
exchange of views, the German Chancellor dragged his feet and reverted to his early
argument for a political agreement. 46 Neither side had indeed shifted their views.
Moreover, making the situation still worse, the Kaiser's remark that Germany would never
agree to anything which would bind her freedom of action had freshly stirred up the
mutual suspicion.
Under such limiting circumstances, the conversation was stillborn. And as the British
general election approached, the subject was quietly dropped. But the British
Government was further convinced of the obnoxious nature of a political accord with
Germany, which would only bring a rupture of her relations with France and Russia at a
time when such friendships were becoming doubly valuable. 4 7

Last Stage of Negotiations, 1911: Up to Agadir Crisis.
After the elections, the negotiations were resumed in January, 1911. The resumption
of the talks were principally caused by Count Metternich's statement to the British
Government that an exchange of naval information could be arranged independently of
any political formula - seemingly a great departure from the previous German
position. 48 However, this favorable atmosphere was soon dispelled by a series of
contradicting elements originating from Berlin. First, the British naval attache Watson
reported - with a covering letter of concurrence from Goschen - that there were rumors
of a supplementary law which would further increase the German naval strength in
1912. 49 Secondly, Kaiser in one of his frequent moments of indiscretion told the British
military attache that an exchange of information was of no use at all and that only a
political understanding could smooth the relations between the two countries. 5 0

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol6/iss2/6
74

12

Rhee: Anglo-German Naval Rivalry as a Factor in the Deterioration of Th
Goschen and Sir A. Nicolson (London's Ambassador to Russia) had come to the
conclusion that the discussions with Berlin would come to no useful end, and that any
further gesture on the part of Britain would be solely for the purpose of avoiding a
sudden rupture with Germany.51 Hence, both sides vainly went through the motion of
reconciliation. In February, Britain proposed the exchange of naval information based on
Count Metternich's communication in January. 5 2 But the German answer to London's
proposal were delayed until March. On March 24, Goschen reported to Grey that
Bethmann-Hollweg was only interested in an exchange based on "reciprocity" and
simultaneity: 1) "that it will not do for one side to furnish information and for the other
to use that as a basis for increasing its programme of shipbuilding;" and 2) that "the
information arranged for should be exchanged between the 1st of October and 16th of
November every year,,,53 Kiderlen-Wiichter further limited the scope of the exchange by
insisting on one year period only.54
However, London soon found a serious defect in this counterproposal. The British
Admiralty advised the Foreign Office that the period of October 1 to November 15 was
the time when German naval estimates were made, and hence, the feeding of information
would only help Germany tailor her plans to nullify London's naval program. On the
contrary, London would have to decide its own program without the knowledge of
German and Austrian plans. 55 Naturally, Crowe branded the German proposal as
unworthy of confidence, and was not acceptable.
There was virtually no chance for an agreement of any kind with this deepening
suspicion. Through March and April, Britain had made one more serious effort to break
the impasse by proposing a "simulataneous conclusion of a political and naval
understanding" - a proposal repeatedly made by Germany herself. 5 6 But even to this,
the German answer was totally negative, namely, that she could no longer discuss "the
retardation of tempo of the German naval program." This meant the withdrawal of the
only substantial German proposal to Britain up to that time. 5 7 Germany merely
explained that due to her financial situation, "a continuous employment in the German
shipbuilding and armament works" was necessary. This as an explanation was both
insufficient and ominous as far as Britain was concerned. Indeed, the end of the
negotiations was clearly in sight. The German dispatch of the gunboat "Panther" and the
resultant Agadir Crisis totally jeopardized the last remaining hope. Lloyd George's tough
Mansion House speech clearly spelled out Britain's future action against Germany. In this
context, the Haldane Mission to Germany in 1912 had no working basis whatsoever, and
was doomed to failure from the very start.

Conclusion
The continuous abortion of the negotiations had increased the British fear, and the
conversations had drifted from "naval limitation" to the vaguer, more indefinable, and
potentially explosive "political sphere." After years of running conversations, and
exchange of notes and memoranda, the German position had not changed an inch from
its original point of view: namely, Germany could not afford to make any concessions
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unless Britain promised her "neutrality" in a continental war. However, Britain with the
growing aggressiveness of German policy could not give this promise without destroying
the crucial ententes with France and Russia.
Moreover, Grey's advisers in the Foreign Office were uniformly prejudiced against
Germany, and incapable of being daring and original in their approach to the German
problem. They regarded Germany as the prime menance to British security, and deeply
suspected the true intentions of the German naval buildup. Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir Charles
Hardinge, and Sir Arthur Nicolson all opposed concessions to Germany, which might have
fundamentally changed the atmosphere. To compound the issue, Grey himself having
little knowledge of Germany and of foreign relations was influenced and dominated by
the opinions and ideas of his advisers. 5 8 On the German side, the Kaiser was
immovably determined to make Germany "a block of steel forged by the hammer of
God." He believed that the development of German trade and commerce was possible
"only behind German armed forces, above all, behind a respectable German navy."S9
Von Tirpitz equally adamant in his determination to expand the German navy
jeopardized in every possible way the materialization of a genuine naval agreement with
Britain. Chancellors after Bismarck were all ill equipped to tackle the increasingly
difficult problems inherent in the rise of global German power with bold imagination and
originality. Bulow was stubborn, and Bethmann-Hollweg was weak vis-a-vis the mercurial
Kaiser and ignorant of foreign relations, and dominated by the permanent foreign office
advisers all prejudiced against Britain. Somewhat moderate Ambassador Metternich could
have done more, but lacked the necessary good relations with the Kaiser and von Tirpitz
- the two who called the tune. He had to resign in the end because of his conflicts with
Tirpitz and over the issue of controlling the naval attache nominally under him in the
London Embassy. Indeed, throughout the crucial years, the political activities of the
German naval pressure group were too strong to be set aside, and involved political risks
for those who would oppose it. 60
Both parties were incapable, therefore, of fmding a mutually agreeable, fundamental
solution to their deepening differences. In a way, then, the German Insistence on a
political understanding, and the British insistence on a technical naval accord were
understandable from their respective viewpoints. However, the German "shock
diplomacy" over various crises more than any other factor had convinced Britain of the
sagacity of her policy of ententes with France and Russia, and she was never inclined to
dispense with the good will of both countries.
Indeed, to Britain, Germany's menance seemed to be complete: The strongest army on
the continent as well as her large navy never ceased to scare Britain of the possibility of
German hegemony on the Continent. Should it materialize, Britain would be completely
isolated, and absolutely dependent on Germany's good will.
As a result, both governments dragged out their conversations without any sincere
intention of concluding a viable agreement. Both were trying to exhaust the opposite side
and place the blame and responsibility for the ultimate failure and rupture. Finally when
the talks broke down, both were rather happily relieved of the seemingly unending
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misery. The Haldane Mission of 1912 was doomed from the start in the sense that it had
no chance of changing all these ingrained feelings on both sides.
Britain fundamentally wanted a weak Germany or a Germany without a naval
ambition, which would not collide with the British interest - long or short run. 61
Germany wanted a "place in the sun," and the contradiction was sure to follow.
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